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دراسة مقارنة للفساد السياسي في بعض الدول العربية: حالة الحكومات والمؤسسات والمنظمات والأفراد				

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ABSTRACT

Comparative Study of Political Corruption in Arab Countries: Case of Governments, Institutions, Organizations and Individuals

This research studies comparative cases of political corruption of Arab countries in relevance to their cultural environment. It investigates the relationship between the corrupt political culture and the corrupt governments, institutions, organizations and individuals. It analyzes the nature, causes, impact and the solution of corruption in certain Arab countries. It shows that the Arab tribal-based society has a corrupt common political culture which produces what the study calls "government-structural and self-enrichment corruption". The Arab public officials as well as their supporters in their society are not held accountable for their corruption because the anti-corruption methods are either non-existent or ineffective. The study has found that the two types of corruption are organically interrelated in a self-perpetuated process, which characterizes Arab political leaders as well as their supporters of organizations and individuals. They set their own standards of what corruption is, which encourages immorality and violates the public interest for their own interest. The solution to corruption is to adopt a public service ideology implemented through democratic governments, civil society, free private sector, transparency, accountability and international anti-corruption mechanisms. The study uses historical methodology to find out the relation of corruption between the political environment and Arab public officials on the one hand, and between those officials and the rest of the society on the other. The significance of the research lies with adding new theoretical and factual knowledge to the topic of corruption in general and the Arab political corruption in particular, on which there is scarce literature due to the sensitivity of this to Arab governments under study. In addition, the research provides reasonable advice to Arab public leaders on how to combat corruption for the public good.

Introduction:

The topic of corruption as a value and as a fact is intellectually stimulating and is an action demanding to investigate and correct what is wrong in human behavior. Corruption could be defined as the misuse of public power for private profit, through personal or family or governmental ties, in public or private sectors (Pope, 1996:9). Its causes, symptoms, types, practices, continuation and fighting it have direct relationships to the prevailing political culture of society, whether democratic or dictatorial, which affects in proportion all aspects of the political practices, this is illustrated in figure 1, page 32. This interrelationship between the political culture and governmental corruption as well as other social corruption can be found in Arab countries which have a common denominator of dictatorial political culture. Their corruption can not be understood without knowing the political corruption are inseparable parts of the same whole social phenomenon.

Research Problem

The research problem is that there is a direct relationship between dictatorial political culture as an independent variable and corruption of all social types as a dependent variable in Arab countries included in this research. Their corrupt political values inherently lead to corrupt ways of doing business in public and private institutions. The persistence of their political corruption has reinforced the existence of various levels of institutionalized corruption to become a social disease in those Arab countries.

Research Hypotheses

The nature of this research problem requires using the type of relational hypothesis to measure the relationship between the cause and effect of corruption. There is a proportional relationship between the corruption of political culture and the political and other social corruption in the studied Arab countries. The more corrupt the political culture ideas and values are the more corrupt political systems, practices and interests are and the less democracy there is. And with more political dictatorship there is more corruption and vice versa, an intricate process in which one sustains the other. The confirmation or rejection of these hypotheses will be tested by the available data which covers each part of the research.

Research Questions

The major questions become the following: why and how does a corrupt political culture pave the way for corruption in all sectors of society in the studied Arab countries? What are the symptoms, types and practices of corruption? Have Arab countries succeeded or failed in facing political corruption? And what methods and measures have they used against corruption?

Research Objectives

The major objective of this research is to study the causal relationship between dictatorial political culture and corrupt practices in various layers of society in certain Arab countries. In specific, it is to find out the impact of an in-cohesive and undemocratic political structure on running prosperously various levels of modern life activities in those Arab countries. The historical methodology is utilized to analyze different aspects of corruption as developed over a long time to permeate in various degrees public and private life of those Arab countries.

While the phenomenon of corruption has immensely grown, yet there has been a serious lack of research to cover it in the Arab states. The reason is that there is no political freedom in them to diagnose and combat corruption. Although corruption is a growing international problem but it has reached a much larger scale in the Arab states. These negative conditions limit the availability of literature on this issue. However, this research has thoroughly investigated important data covering this thorny issue in an Arab context.

Research Difficulties

There is a lack of data on corruption in Arab sources due to the sensitivity of the topic as the Arab countries are governed by dictatorial regimes, which do not allow criticism and freedom of speech. Therefore, it would be futile to go to Arab countries to get information from individuals and institutions which would be punished for their help. The researcher would also be prevented from collecting the needed data under security pretext; otherwise, this would be a waste of time and money. Neither did the researcher have the necessary financial resources to cover his travel and other expenses needed throughout the phases of this research.

Arab Countries under Study

They have the same cultural background, especially language (العسري), 1969: 23, 147), and were subjected to the same colonial experience; therefore, it

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would not be surprising to find Arab countries living under the same political values to have similar political ethics. The same ethics dominate the Arab countries from Persia, East of Asia to Mauritania, West of Africa. However, this work will only include major Arab Countries in what is politically called the Middle East, excluding Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco and Mauritania as lying outside the region and other regional non-Arab countries such as Turkey, Cyprus, Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan. The studied Arab countries are Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Oman, United Arab Emirates (UAE), Kuwait, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Palestine, Egypt and Libya, see figure 1, page 32.

Conceptual Framework of Ethics, Corrupt Political and Social Practices in Arab Countries

Ethics could be defined as the standard of working behavior (Henkel and Tucker, 1992: 696). In other words, it is the natural moral power in human beings which guides their behavior toward striking a balance between one's own interest and that of society, whereas in the absence of moral power, the balance of private and public interests is lost, a situation which is called corruption. This social phenomenon is the product of political culture which also determines the way of dealing with corruption. Under democratic political values, law can be applied through the measures of transparency and accountability to reveal and punish corruption. Transparency means a clear understanding of detecting and seeing corruption; while accountability means to hold the corrupt responsible for liability. Such measures cannot exit in dictatorial political systems. Arnold Heidenheimer spoke of the political corruption leading to public maladministration which is defined as perversion of power, extortion, intentional miss-performance and neglect of duty (Caiden, 1971: 85).

It is therefore impossible to separate public and private corruption from the social environment. Public business transactions, Meyer Fieldberg argues, is very heavily influenced by the social structure as well as the values and norms of people (Fieldberg, 1972: 264). Similarly Joseph Massie and Jan Luytjes argue that political and business affairs are interrelated as part of one environment (Luytjes and Massie, 1972: 315).

This interrelationship helps to explain corruption in countries of different political cultures. Democratic and dictatorial countries suffer from various degrees of corruption. Even in the United States, with its democratic base, Americans grew to accept corruption and live with it (Caiden, 1980: 6).

But the United States is also more capable than other countries to combat corruption as the political system is open for transparency and accountability.

The impact of political environment on doing all kinds of business can be seen in the Arab countries. They all live under the same dictatorial political culture which encourages corrupt behavior and widely permeates the public and private sectors. The dictatorial nature of the Arab political structure allows for all sorts of corruption, governmental and private as shown in figure 1, page 32. Governmental corruption means the use of political power by the ruling bureaucracy for personal interests and private corruption means dishonest service of interest outside the frame of government, which could include individuals and groups. Thus, the service of public interest is damaged for serving private interest, which is called corruption. This is unavoidable in political dictatorship in which the government is imposed on people and can not be held accountable for its actions. Khaled al-Nasser maintains that dictatorship characterizes all Arab governments as installed by force and as they work for the interests of the rulers (49: 1983، الناصر). It is also unexpected from dictatorial governments to reform themselves. The self-interested rulers and their opposition to reform is explained by Usameh Shahwan who maintains that the aversion to reform would be contradictory to the interests of powerholders in non-democratic countries in order to continue dominating the rest of society (1998، شهوان، Moreover, the Arab countries like the rest of the Third World are plagued by what Jay Weinstein and John Weinstein identified as the softness of state being dependent, centralized, Westernized, and with rigid bureaucracy and undisciplined public (Caiden, 1980: 24).

The conceptual framework has established the relationship between the dictatorial political culture and the social corruption to analyze the political ethics in the researched Arab countries.

Corrupt Political Culture as the Root-Cause of Different Social Corruption

Those who talk about the people of our day being given up to robbery and similar vices will find that they are all due to the fact that those who ruled them behaved in like manner. Nccolo machiavelli the Discourses, 111 (29) (Pope, 1996:9)

The roots of corruption in the Arab countries lie with the absence of independent legislative powers as the essence of democracy and the presence of dominant executives as the embodiment of dictatorship in Arab states like those of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates,

alongside with those of Iraq under Sudam Hussein and the American occupation, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, Egypt and Libya. However in some of them, elections could be held for political gains to calm internal opposition and to get international acceptance of their regimes. Fore instance, Kuwait had legislative elections which until 2005 were reserved to men without women participation and when they were allowed to vote, their participation was on condition abiding of bv the Islamic law (http://www.inssidejustice.com/law/index.php/intl/2005/06/16/p47:1-2).vet, today the legislative council could be dissolved by the Emir of Kuwait as his privilege and not by the will of all Kuwaitis as the Kuwaiti constitution tilts in his favor for tribal dominance, for his family holds most cabinet positions and has final he the sav in politics (http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/5109290.stm:1-2). This holds true for the rest of the Arab Gulf elections in which political gains and powers are distributed on tribal and family lines. In Saudi Arabia there is no constitution, but there are Ulema who must approve the laws based on the Wahabi Islam which the ruling Saudi family uses for legitimizing its control. Saudi municipal elections were held in 2005 only for half of members and the second half was appointed by the government to retain a veto power over the elected half (Cervellera, 2009:1). Under the absolutist ruling Saudi family as inspired by the Wahabi ideology, women are not allowed to participate in the municipal elections (http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2005/feb/10/saudiarabia:1). Similar political

(http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2005/feb/10/saudiarabia:1). Similar political corruption exists in Bahrain where the King imposes his own political system in which he is allowed to appoint the upper house members in order to control all the legislation. The first Bahraini elections were allowed in 2002. However, it is worth noting that the Emir cancelled the constitution in 1973 and dissolved the parliament in 1975 (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/elections_in_bahrain:1-2). Political absolutism also ruled in Oman where Sultan Kabus is the head of state and government. Political parties are not allowed there. Besides, the Sultan has limited the role of the legislative body to giving advice for the government and has left it without power in foreign policy, defense and finance. He does not have a successor during his life, leaving the matter to his family to decide after his death (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/politics_of_oman:1-2). Undemocratic politics extended to the federal UAE where the presidency is given to al-

Nahyan clan and the premiership to al-Maktoom clan by hereditary. No political parties are allowed and the civil society is close to non-existence while half of the federal parliament is appointed by local rulers (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/politics of the united Arab Emirares:2-3). The same tribal politics rules Qatar where there are no political parties and elections are planned for 2010 in which 30 parliament members will be elected and 15 will be appointed bv the Emir of Oatar (http://en.wiki/gatari legilative election 2010:1).

As for Lebanon, the political system may seem democratic for holding elections, but it is based on consociated framework by which the executive and legislative powers are distributed on religious, sectarian and ethnic bases. This political framework was put by the French colonialism in 1943 which gave each religious community certain number of seats, 6-to-5 ratio of Christians to Muslims in the parliament until this was changed in the end of the Lebanese civil war in 1990. Top positions were allocated along these lines, the president was to be Maronite Christian, the prime minister a Sunni Muslim and the speaker of the parliament a Shii Muslim. In this system political institutions are secondary to confessional personalities, who at the same time control political parties, while local families affect political developments to a big degree, yet Palestinian refugees, in spite of their big number, are politically marginalized (http:en.wikipedia.org/wiki/politics of lebanon.2009 07:36:25 GMT: 1-3).

There is no true democracy in which all Lebanese Muslims and Christians are treated as free and equal citizens aside from their religious denomination or sect or ethnicity. For Jordan, the elections are run under the scrutiny of the king who dominates the political system which is based on tribal and family interests. According to the constitution, the king can appoint or depose the prime minister; he is the commander-in-chief of the armed forces; he appoints the upper house members of parliament; elections are to be run under his watch through the government supervision (http:///www.medea.be/?page-2&lang=en&doc=253:3). There is much of government intervention to block certain parties, especially the Islamic bloc from having influential political role. The Islamic bloc was harassed to the point of boycotting the municipal elections of 2007 accusing the government of fraud in the election while the government considered the Islamic bloc illegal (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_est/6923923.stm:1). At the same time, there is much political role for the tribes to play as their areas are overrepresented in

the parliament (<u>http://www.menassat.com/?q=en/weblog-directory/2236-jordans-elections-its-tribes-stupid:1</u>). The Jordanian tribes constitute the main source of support for the ruling Hashemite family.

The Egyptian elections are characterized by violence and government intervention to control the opposition. Parliament seats are limited in numbers to certain parties like that of the Muslim Brotherhood while the ruling national party has a free hand to manipulate the elections in its favor. The last parliamentary elections were marked by violence in which several people were killed by the police though the government denied it. While the government had unlimited number of candidates for elections, it limited those of the Muslim Brotherhood to 21 candidates. With such government intervention, the elections would not be competitive (Myton, 2009:1-1). To strengthen his grip on power, Mubarak amended the constitution to create a supreme committee for presidential elections dominated by his party to decide election issues (http://www.cfr.org/publication/744/egypt.htm:3). The neighboring Libya does not have independent organizations as considered against the people's congresses which were invented according to the Third World Theory of al-Kaddafi. He considered elections a suspicious Western phenomenon and any opposition to his rule will be crushed bv force. (http://www.pogar.org/countries/theme.asp?th=2&cid=10:1-2). Like other Arab countries, Palestine has its share of political corruption, and public figures abuse their power despite the democratically elected government. The Chairman of Budget Committee in the Palestinian Legislative Council takes the view that corruption has not yet deepened in the Palestinian culture and society (Shuaibi, 2009:1).

In Arab countries the collective power of people through the legislative bodies is paralyzed by despotic executives of kings, Sultans, Emirs, presidents and military dictators. Such despotic rulers act as law unto itself, considering themselves owners of land and people without being held accountable to a public authority. Jalal Abdalla Muawid describes their political corruption in the following: they depend on the allegiance of close circles of supporters, families and tribes but not legislative political organizations, such as legislative powers and parties, which in fact have no impact on political life — a process which leads to mistrust and doubts among the public $(74-73 : 1983 \cdot 290)$. Although modern political organizations exist in Arab countries, yet their political affairs, as Thobian shows, are run on an undemocratic basis of

personal, family and tribal considerations. This is the case of Saudi Arabia and the neighboring states in the Arabian Peninsula, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq and others. Also political positions are given on the same undemocratic considerations (23-24, 125, 304-305 : 1997، ذبيان). There is another part to the problem of democracy, for religion is the basis of political thinking and dispensation of power in the Arab society. Saudi Arabia and Lebanon stand as examples of religious dominance of the political affairs since religion is the basis of their state existence. In Saudi Arabia the state is structured on the eighteenth century Islamic Wahabi movement (42: 1982 ، عبد الرحيم). This movement called for applying pure Islam as it was in the days of the Prophet Mohammed and Ibn Saud, the founder of the ruling Saudi dynasty used the new movement to his advantage to keep control of Arabia against local and foreign opposition (Ali, 2009: 1-2). While the Lebanese state is a model of confessional system in which people are fragmented into various Christian and Muslim sects with political power proportional to their religious affiliation (Suleiman, 1967: 12-13). In both cases politics suffer from religious intervention which leads to bureaucratic conflict in government and administrative corruption which reflects negatively on the rest of social institutions.

Political despotism and the social incoherence it created is a fertile ground for bureaucratic corruption and maladministration which have continuously plagued Arab governments. Undemocratic politics of Arab leaders inflicted incalculable damage to the public interests of their people. In their own way, Saddam Hussein making himself the military ruler of Iraq and Hafiz al-Assad and his succeeding son Bashar controlling the political life in Syria are examples of corrupt political leaderships. Corruption did not end with the disappearance of the Baath leaders, Saddam and Hafiz, but continued as part of the political life of Iraq and Syria. With the American occupation of Iraq in 2003 corruption increased to new levels. An American official working for the reconstruction of Iraq since 2004 identified 25 corrupt cases to the American Department of Justice that Iraq witnessed an insurgency of corruption and mismanagement. He stated that the Iraqi government corruption reached about 10% of the national income, amounting close to four American billion dollars (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2hilmiddle eat/6131290.stm p.1-2). For Syria, the al-Assad family controlled it through a coup d'etat for a long time since 1970 which in itself corruption. In 2008, the Transparency International

ranked Syria the 147 out of the most 180 corrupt countries while Iraq came 178. In the corruption index of 18 Arab countries, Syria came 17 and Iraq was 18 (http://www.nohrs.org/fs/index.php?option=com content&task=view&id=121 &itemid=56:1). Only under international pressures, Arab leaders like King Hussein of Jordan allowed for some kind of elections in that country (Deegan, 1993: 134). In Kuwait, the source of political corruption is the ruling family of al-Sabah, who until 2005 prevented women from participating in the political life of the country. Although it is claimed by the ruling family that there is a Kuwaiti National Legislative Assembly elected by popular vote, but voting was until three years ago only confined to Kuwaiti males with an ancestry going back prior to 1920. Until 1992 seventy per cent of the Kuwaitis were foreigners excluded from the political participation, which was made up of only 6.4% of the total population in the election of 1981, thus making political representation claimed by Kuwait as a fake concept (Deegan, 1993: 36). There are many people called Badoon (without Kuwaiti citizenship) who have been living in Kuwait for decades and are not recognized by the government and can not participate in political life.

A corrupt Arab leadership can also be seen in Oman where foreign advisers participated in decision-making for their own interests at the expense of Omani interests. The reliance on foreign advisers served Sultan Kabus to strengthen his grip on the country as his number one interest. There is always feud within the Kabus family over who should rule Oman. Only by military force and reliance on the British, he could sustain power against his own family and the Democratic Omani Movement, which called for democratization (شهداء 325-322: 1989.). Like Oman, Egypt had also been subjected to one-man rule initiated by Jamal Abd al-Nasser in 1952. He framed the Egyptian constitution according to his personal political values. His successors Mohammed Anwar al-Sadat and Hosni Mubarak followed him in controlling the Egyptian political life. They kept power by phony elections of success with 95% and above (247-242: 1983: 1983: 14). The same political reality exists in Libya where one man, Mummer al-Kaddafi, has controlled power by military and tribal support since 1969. His brand of "popular democracy" for a complete political participation of people has been a failure as is the case in other Arab countries (معود ،1983 : 64).

As for Palestine, though a newly established democracy, it shares the same Arab political culture and types of corruption. The resignation of the

Higher Education Minister, Hanan Ashrawi, and the Agricultural Minister, Abdul Jawad Saleh, in the late 1990s due to the fact that the Palestinian National Authority did not act on the Legislative Council call for removing corrupt ministers is an indicator of corruption (TI Newsletter, September 1998: 13). But corruption reached a deeper level because of the shady separation of powers in the political system, which opened the way for governmental officials to abuse their positions against others. As a result, civil courts were turned into state security courts, which created juridical anarchy (حقوق الناس،) 23:2000 Corruption continues to persist as certain individuals control unquestioned political and economic influence because of their position and connection in government and society. Public opinion polls held for the legislative election of 2004-5 showed that the public perception of corruption determined the chances of electing candidates. A majority of Palestinians believed that there is an institutional corruption without holding the corrupt to (http://goliath.ecnext.com/coms2/gi 0199-424082/the-politics-ofaccount corruption-in.html:1-3).

In this section, the research tried to pinpoint major causes of corruption in Arab countries. The corrupt political culture is for internal and external reasons, the root cause of the overall corruption. More detailed discussion of Arab political corruption will be conducted in the next part.

Dimensions of Political Corruption in Arab Countries

There are several dimensions of corruption to be discussed in this part, as figure 1, page 32 shows, among which are symptoms of corruption, types of corruption and practice of corruption.

Symptoms of Corruption

Corruption can generally be detected in governmental and private activities of institutions, individuals, groups, families and organizations. Most likely governmental corruption can be found in allocating money to public expenditure to re-divide public funds and lands, collecting taxes and hiring people. Corruption exists when money is given to governmental officials intervening with the government to get deals and tamper with the public interests without fearing the law. Under the shadow of corrupt political culture, symptoms of public and private corruption appear in the form of cronyism, connection (wasta), family and personal intervention, kickbacks (bakhshish) and fraud of different forms. (Pope, 1996: 10)

In the Arab context, the most glaring symptoms of public corruption are manifested in the large public sector for the benefit of the ruling elites. Mahmud A. al-Fadeel diagnoses the symptoms of corruption of Arab governments as dominated by huge bureaucracy which works for the bourgeois ruling elites. This bureaucracy has a direct role in decision-making at the expense of the legislative powers in some Arab countries like the Gulf states, Egypt, Syria, Iraq and Jordan (273-276:1987 (الفضيل)). The Arab political corruption based on tribalism and conservatism has prevented people from participating in public affairs. The ruling elites use democracy to perpetuate their dominance and never allow power sharing. Tribalism and democracy are understood in the Arab corrupt political culture to mean one thing which is the domination of certain ruling families. This is what Thobian meant when he said democracy was used by the ruling families to gain legitimacy without practicing democracy (5:1997 (i.e., 1997)).

Public and private corruption can mix in the fight over political power. In Lebanon money is used in elections to help politicians gain power. While sometimes ministers and legislators are appointed without elections to satisfy certain centers of power (Thobian, 1997, PP. 304-305). There are obvious symptoms of governmental and self-enrichment corruption permeating the government, institutions, organizations and persons. Lots of money is given to companies willing to give bribes to ministers who give the companies projects resulting in destroying confidence in the business environment. These symptoms come from the source of patronage by which politicians derive public support in return for their services to their friends, cronies and political constituents (http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi hb650/is /ai n255665:1). Similar corruption is in Oman where the ruling family of Kabus robs public wealth for its own benefit; appoint unqualified ministers and obey foreign powers in return for political support. Even decision-making is in the hands of Kabus alone and the distribution of money in the public service depends on his personal satisfaction (329-327:1989،شهداء). Corruption symptoms are reflected on the family and governmental officials' domination of business and the high salaries of their relatives driving the most expensive cars (http://muscatconfidential.blogspot.com/2007/09/omanicoruption.html:1). Despotic executives which run public affairs in collaboration with private

interests for mutual benefit can be seen in Jordan, Gulf states and Iraq where corrupt political activities are done secretly behind the back of legislative

powers and other political organizations.(24-23 :1997، نبيان). In spite of having a legislative assembly, the Kuwaiti executive of al-Sabah family controls public spending and imposes censorship on the press to prevent reporting cases of corruption (Deegan, 1993: 37-38). Symptoms of corruption are apparent in all ministries to the point where the Transparency International showed further signs of corruption in Kuwait politics and business (http://www.metimes.com/business/2006/06/27/corruption dominates kuwait election campaign/5075/:1-2). In the Arab Gulf countries, according to Transparency International, Saudi Arabia has more signs of corruption than Oman, Qatar, UAE and Jordan (which is outside the Gulf region) (http://muscatconfidential.blogspot.com/2009/09/omanicorruption.html:2).

Having similar despotic political culture under one party system, Syria, Iraq, Egypt and Libya reflect the same symptoms of corruption. Under the Baath rule of Syria, there is a wide-spread corruption in the economy through governmental intervention. This is accompanied by political corruption as a result of familial power conflict in al-Assad family, especially between the brothers Hafiz and Rifaat and the latter was known for much corruption in the Syrian government (Deegan, 1993: 66-68). During the rule of Hafiz's son Bashar, the culture of corruption persisted in government and society. Signs of corruption could be seen from the case of the businessman Rami Makhluf, who used his maternal cousin relationship with Bashar to intimidate his competitors manipulating judicial and intelligence by the Syrian institutions (http://treas.gov/press/releases/hp834.htm:1-2). In the neighboring Iraq of Saddam Hussein, the Baath government spent most public money on its military and bureaucratic civil services, while the army of poor people grew in number under what al-Fadeel called "state capitalism" dominating Iraq like that of Syria and Egypt (293-292،290 : 1987، الفضيل). Under the American occupation in 2003, corruption grew stronger as seen in various levels of government and society. According to an American investigating team, there are plenty of theft, wasta (connection), fraud and money squandering in the Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki government (Roston and Myers, 2009:1-2). Similar corrupt governments have existed in Egypt as they dominated society through military and government bureaucracy which controlled the industry and the internationalized properties. This has formed the administrative, military and technocratic class which is the tool of government to control a largely poor and an illiterate society (279:1987، الفضيل). Symptoms of corruption under

Mubarak government can be detected in press stories about corrupt officials and public figures to the point of becoming a social phenomenon. There are stories about the son of Mubarak becoming a billionaire and the spread of bribing officials to get things done in government institutions (http://democraticegypt.blogspot.com/2006/04/corruption-in-egypt.html:1). What is typical of these corrupt governments is also typical of the Libyan government which is based on technical-bureaucratic class working in collaboration with the ruling elite of al-Kaddafi, who decides investment, public expenditure and controls the hard currency reserve to serve their selfinterest at the expense of public interests (20: 1987 الفضيل). This is done under the appearance of popular democracy promulgated by al-Kaddaf's Third World Theory in which peoples' committees are the essence of political interaction, while in fact they prevent the freedom of expression and association of people by law (http://www.pogar.org/countries/theme.asp?th=2&cid=10:1-3).

Symptoms of corruption have been analyzed in Jordan and Palestine as well. For Jordan, poverty and corruption were found to be correlated according to the Transparency International's Global Corruption Index of 2006 (Wardam, 2006: 4). A poll conducted by the University of Jordan showed that most people believed that corruption grew stronger in public and private sectors, and there was no faith in combating its facets of nepotism, wasta, fraud and graft. The case of corruption of the former Municipal Affairs minister was only one case out of many which the respondents believed were prevalent in Jordan (Hamzeh, 2006: 1-3).

For Palestine, specific investigated cases of governmental officials reflect symptoms of political corruption. For example, the Palestinian Legislative Council in the late 1990s accused the Executive Power of wasting public money and failing in duty when the Ministry of Social Affairs distributed spoiled food stuff like flour (Abdallah, 1998: 4). Also in 2004, the Palestinian Legislative Council looked into accusations of a top Palestinian official and his relatives who supplied ready-made concrete to Israeli settlements licensed by the Palestinian Authority (http://www.countercurrents.org/ei-abunimah240604.htm:1-2). These cases are only a veneer under which lies deep-rooted corruption.

To sum up, symptoms of political corruption have been identified in Arab countries of different political regimes. Their governments share the same corruption symptoms as they have similar undemocratic political culture. The

structure of Arab governments is based on personal, familial, tribal and religious lines which allow corruption at the government-structural and selfenrichment levels. The Arab ruling elites supported by their families, military, and bureaucrats control public fund, decision-making and the disposal of land and resources for private interests. Corruption symptoms are a commonality of Arab countries which are plagued by the same types of corruption. These two types will be discussed in the next part.

Types of Corruption

It is not an easy issue to classify the types of corruption for the generality of the concept covering all forms of corruption in society. However, this research, as shown in figure 1, page 32, identifies two types of corruption in Arab countries: one is government-structural corruption and the other is self-enrichment corruption. Yet the two types of corruption come from a single source of an undemocratic Arab political culture. Caiden classifies types of corruption to bureaucratic and mal-administrative corruption which could mean sometimes the same thing. His classification is drawn on corruption in the advanced countries like the United States, which makes this classification less relevant to studying corruption in Arab countries as having undemocratic political culture (Caiden, 1980: 4-5). Instead, this work finds it more relevant to propose the government-structural and self-enrichment classification in dealing with the topic of corruption in Arab countries.

For the government-structural corruption, it can be defined as a built-in political mal-administration of government resulting from the non-separation of powers. Public law is ignored in the course of public service as public officials put themselves above the law. Jubbra agrees that the public officials become immoral to the point of going against the law by giving favors for money (Caiden, 1980: 14). This type of corruption permeates the public and private sectors of Arab societies which are laden with various acts and forms of corruption. It is also the umbrella under which private interests thrive at the expense of the public. The Government-structural corruption is caused by the lack of real separation of three powers in the Arab governments. These powers are practically in the hands of dictators under different names- president, king, Emir or Sultan. Supported by their party or family or tribe or sect or a combination of them, rulers and officials are in a positron to force their own whim on the public. Therefore, legitimate political elections, which are supposed to be drawn on public elections of rulers and officials, are replaced by

dictatorial political apparatuses which have all the power and are above the law. The despotic political situation is described by a think tank institution which says that there are in the Arab World absolute autocratic regimes in which law is the ruler's will, by which he decides what is permitted and otherwise; thus, corruption is the essence of their regimes (al-Effendi, 2009:1). They are not held responsible for their wrong acts according to measures of transparency and accountability, for these measures do not truly exist in Arab countries. This helps rulers to commit any form of corruption in violation of good ethics including: perversion of legislative power, failure of legislating and implementing legislative intent; failure of carrying out duties, step-siding and bending the law, preventing corruption investigation, abuse of discretion, nepotism, bias, inefficiency, abuse of power, policy randomness, lack of communication, media blacking, using deception, defending criminality, discrimination, oppression, appointing unqualified persons, negligence, arbitrariness, kickbacks, waste, taking land, swindling, embezzlement, illegal investment, racketeering, grafting, bribery, black-marketing and bogus civil service. Pope adds to them giving permits to import and export, giving concessions for developing business, providing licensees to operate business, grant police protection for business, reducing taxes or getting higher taxes, wavering customs duties, exemption from law enforcement, lacking safety and environmental standards and paying hoodlums to scare business people and receiving payments from business for protection (Pope, 1996 : 11).

With entrenched government-structural corruption in the Arab governments, it would be impossible for them to carry out their duty toward the public, and their corruption becomes self-perpetuated process to involve all society. The ground would also be fertile for the other type of self-enrichment corruption. This can be defined as individual profit at the expense of the public interest by discarding ethics and breaking the law. It is equivalent to what Pope defines as using personal and family ties to affect decisions of private agents and public officials for personal profit (Pope, 1996: 9). The Self-enrichment corruption grows among individuals who seek wealth by all means possible like the support of corrupt governments. Among aspects of this type of corruption are self-preservation, dishonesty, circumventing law, knit-circles of friends or tribesmen or villagers, kickbacks, favoritism, expediency, venality, incompetence and robbery. Such corruption has its own course of development and is originally sustained by the government-structural corruption.

instance, an Arab ruler could give his sons public lands and special advantage in trade with compensation for losses from public funds (al-Effendi, 2009:3).

The totality of corruption in Arab countries is the combination of government-structural and self-enrichment corruption. As deep-seated in society, corruption gives long life to all vices without a chance for any remedy. Even fighting corruption becomes part of corruption itself as the corrupt is protected by the government. This could be shown by the action of the Syrian government of Hafiz al-Assad which is also typical of other Arab governments. It sought to punish those responsible for bribery, abusing influence, embezzlement, exploitation of office and illegal profit, but as it was found out that the corrupt people were mostly of the al-Alawi family, it stopped the process of punishing them (Deegan, 1993: 65). The same happened during his son Bashar's government when the Syrian official Z'ubi tried to fight corruption, but at the end he was turned into the subject of investigation which led to his suicide. In Arab countries, disobeying the ruler is corruption (al-Effendi, 2009:3). This is further explained by Jubbra who maintains that reducing the governmental corruption in Arab Countries like Lebanon, Iraq and Syria, reinforces corruption the very same disease they want to cure because the culture is widely corrupt (Caiden, 1980: 13). Even in this case, combating corruption is only a cosmetic process taken to impress the public in order to consolidate one's political advantages as characteristic of Arab governments, which neither investigate corruption nor punish those involved in it.

Corruption thrives in the absence of guidance from the government to serve the public. In the words of Caiden, the government needs a well-defined service ideology, which means that the government represents the general will and public trust to serve all and not the few; officials must honestly serve the public or quit serving; they must be hired on qualification, not privilege, and be subjected to law as normal citizens (Caiden, 1980: 5-6). Although this service ideology is the ideal of serving public interests, it is not expected to be adopted in undemocratic political culture. Heidenheimer explains that the service ideology cannot work in undemocratic countries, for they lack the right conditions for its application (Caiden, 1980: 6).

Lack of encountering the two-types of corruption in the Arab context means one certain thing: there is a wide-spread practice of corruption in public institutions and other social sectors. This will be discussed in the next part.

Practice of Corruption

just as it is impossible to taste honey or poison that one may find at the tip of one's tongue, so is it impossible for one dealing with government funds not to taste, at least a little bit, of the king's wealth.

Kautilya (Prime-Minister of a State in Northern India)(Pope, 1996: 75).

Where political dictatorship prevails, corruption thrives. Therefore, it would be expected to find corruption in Arab countries where governments are dominated by family and personal leadership. Likewise, business there is managed by family and personal ties rather than merit and free choice. Fareed A. Muna investigated the Arab executive mind in Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates and found that family and personal methods dominated the Arab management style in contradiction to modern impersonal and formal ways of doing business. Muna classified the Arab executive as autocratic as they control decision-making and refuse to delegate power (Muna, 1979: 13, 36, 88, 93, 97, 99-101, 133). In the same way, M. Sami Kasem argued that it was not surprising to find Arab managers opposing to delegate power as a tradition in doing business and because of personal insecurity and inadequacy. The most qualified persons don't reach the top position or get rewarded as the Max Weber's mode of administration demands (Kasem and Habib, 1989:421-424). The practice of political corruption will be discussed in three groups of Arab countries: the Gulf, Fertile-Crescent and North-Africa.

Arab Gulf Countries

Kasem says that Arab managers work within a system of favoritism which is wide-spread in Arab Gulf countries that he studied. These are Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates. He also added Jordan to his study. In Such countries exists what he calls "bedoaucracy" as a management model headed by one strong man demanding loyalty from his subordinates, who are usually traditional, religious, and looking to the welfare of their family or tribe (Kasem and Habib, 1989: 421-424). In such Arab culture of tribal structure promoting favoritism and loyalty at the expense of efficiency, corrupt practices become deep-seated in the context of undemocratic political culture existing in Arab countries.

Centralized decision-making as one aspect of government-structural corruption is reflected on running the public business ineffectively like the Saudi Air Transportation Company. This government-private company does not

provide decent service because of rigid bureaucracy controlling decisionmaking. Since there is no delegation of power as part of the Saudi management local managers, the air company cannot take decisions as the situation requires, but it has to wait for orders to come from the central office in Jeddah which resulted in unbearable difficulties for the public service. The company from top-down is run by the Saudi family and their cronies who leave no room for power-sharing in managing the company (Kasem and Habib, 1989: 75-76). Similarly the ruling family controls Saudi hospitals and intervenes in the management of the health system. Because the government hospitals are under the direct control of the ruling family, this tempts the medical personnel in private hospitals with high salaries to leave their jobs in their original place of work. This causes lack of adequate service for the public who are relying on private hospitals (Kasem and Habib, 1989: 339). The same type of government mismanagement undermined the work of the Green Crescent Health Organization. Bad services and infighting among managers brought the organization to liquidation (Kasem and Habib, 1989: 348). Even these best governmental hospitals are reserved to serve foreign diplomatic corps rather than local Saudis who find it increasingly difficult to pay the hospital bills. Al-Hamidi Hospital is one of those expensive hospitals which treat foreigners and rich locals for the sake of profit (Kasem and Habib, 1989: 358). Targeting the rich and foreigners at the expense of public service is sought also by the Saudi financial institutions like the Saudi-American Bank (SAMBA). Its banking service is not considered satisfying to the local customers (Kasem and Habib, 1989: 198).

The corrupt government sector in Saudi Arabia certainly affects the private business sector by creating a fertile ground for self-enrichment corruption through bribes and gifts which are exchanged for personal gains at the expense of public good. Muna points to this very fact of corrupt business life in Saudi Arabia and Gulf States, along with other Arab countries such as Egypt, Jordan and Lebanon. He says that there is no difference between giving bribes or gifts to government oficials or someone else for favorable decisions if they are for a private benefit. Gifts and bribes are attributes of the prevailing value system in these countries (Muna, 1979: 95, 138-140). In the shadow of the corruption mantle engulfing the government and private sectors in Arab countries, public resources will be unavoidably abused, mismanaged and wasted. A case of this is found in Saudi Arabia as an example of other Arab

countries where public funds are irrationally spent. The inefficient management of Saudi health sector as well as other sectors stands a witness to both the government-structural and self-enrichment corruption. The Green Crescent health system (GC), which was built from public fund to serve affluent Saudis for the sake of profit, collapsed under the changing economic conditions without achieving its purpose, and finally become a fair game among its profit-seeking owners (Kasem and Habib, 1989: 357). This exemplifies the process of squandering public wealth in the name of governmental grandiose projects of waste, inefficiency and self-enrichment. A glaring example of dissipating public wealth for private interests can be seen in the multi-billion dollars arms deal between the Saudi government and a British defense firm. Saudi Arabia forced the British government to cancel a probe of corruption into the deal lest expose Saudi public and private figures participating (http://www.gulfin it times.com/site/topics/article.asp?cu_no=2&item_no=134082:1).

Next-door Kuwait is a part of the Gulf corruption mantle covering other Arab states. Like the Saudi government, the Kuwaiti government wasted public funds on projects of grandeur like that of the Kuwaiti Airways Corporation (KAC). The kernel of waste and inefficiency in this joint government-private project is the lack of its economic viability. Neither the company generated the required services for the locals or the passing-through, nor did it stand its ground in the face of competition with foreign air ways. No sound business strategy was followed at the operational level or a concrete matrix to judge its success. It finally went into loss under the World economic recession caused by reduced oil prices, less air traffic, cheaper fares and competition with other companies (Kasem and Habib, 1989: 101-102). Wasting public money is seen further in the practice of influential Kuwaitis in participation with foreign investors to embezzle public funds and the funds of the Kuwait Oil Tankers Company (KOTC) (Taleb, 2009: 1).

Similar pompous governmental projects with disappointing results were found in the rest of Arab Gulf countries. For instance, the Gulf Air Firm (GAF), which was jointly owned by the governments of Bahrain, Oman, Qatar and the UAE, lost heavily under the economic recessions and political instability of the area which reduced its operations. In terms of economic viability, the company was not successful, for it was internationally renowned for its over-expenditure (Kasem and Habib, 1989: 114-115, 118, 121)

Managerially, this is considered wasting and abusing of the public money and creating the ground for dismantling the company by competing selfish privateers, a situation similar to what happened to the Saudi and Kuwaiti government companies. This clearly indicates a wide-practice of corruption involving Arab Gulf governments, and it is explained by the following statement of Sultan Kabus of Oman about his reaction to corrupt ministers: "It is better to have а fat rat than а skinnv rat" (http://muscatconfidential.bogspot.com/2007/09/omani-corruption.html:1). Further practice of corruption was revealed by the UAE police at all levels of government administration like nepotism, embezzlement and the abuse of power (http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2005/61701.htm:9).

Corruption does not stop at abusing public fund through waste and inefficient management, but it also involves other aspects of the public life. The ruling families of the Gulf countries apply a policy of job distribution for hiring population to prevent them from disturbing the corrupt status quo. This policy resulted in over-employing people at the expense of productivity and efficiency and subjecting public sectors in the Gulf countries -which is also true of other Arab countries generally-to what is called in management the Parkinson's Law, which means the number of employees exceeds what is needed in places of work. This is responsible for the hidden unemployment in the Gulf countries. Describing the situation of the hidden unemployment in the Gulf, an expert said that it was resulted from employing citizens without a pressing need. There are more employees than needed on the whole, especially in the government departments which reduced productivity and performance of the economy. For instance, the over-employment of nationals reached in Qatar 60% of all Qatari employees. This situation is attributed to the government failure in improving the public educational system and dealing with the phenomenon of laziness among the population (1998 المؤمن). While unemployment in Qatar was a result of government-structural corruption benefiting certain individuals, employment in Bahrain reflected the two types of corruption in which certain employees abused their positions for personal profit. Local employees of the national carrier Gulf Air, in collaboration with international executives, misappropriated fund and abused their work status at the expense of public interests. It is known, however, that the practice of corruption in Bahrain, like other neighboring Gulf countries, is rarely made public (AFP, 2009: 1). This is a glaring example of the government-structural and self-enrichment corruption

characteristic of the Gulf States, where the public and private sectors are arenas for conflicting interests of the rulers and the ruled. Each party maximizes its gains at the expense of the public interests. Inevitably waste, abuse, fraud, bribes, robbery as well as other forms of corruption will find their way in all aspects of the political and business dealings.

Fertile Crescent Arab Countries

The corruption mantle of the government-structural and self-enrichment has expanded to engulf the Arab countries in the Fertile Crescent. Iraq and Syria have similar political and business environment as they are ruled by the Baath party under the banner of national socialism. On the other hand, Lebanon and Jordan are ruled by sectarian and familial political organizations whereas Palestine is under an elected government. However, these countries are part of the Arab corrupt scene. In Iraq, under Saddam Hussein, corruption originated from the structure of government in hands of the few Baath elite. Certain Iraqis like the Kurds and Shiites were excluded from decision-making, and they felt there was political discrimination against them. Saddam Hussein of Iraq played these groups against each other and exploited religion for his own sake. Many Iraqis were expelled or fought under the disguise of conspiring against the Iraqi state. He insisted on a complete Baath control of the government and claimed Iraq was not ready for liberal democracy. In fact, the Baath party dominated the National Assembly and the Revolutionary Command Counsel which enabled the Baath to run the political affairs to exclude others from sharing political power (Deegan, 1993: 75-77). This despotic political regime is similar to regimes of other Arab countries. It depends in its survival on different sorts of corruption: perversion of power, criminality, discrimination, oppression, policy of randomness, nepotism, waste, bribes, embezzlement, black-marketing, paying hoodlums to scare others, favoritism, robbery, helping friends, families and tribes and appointing the unqualified. Only through such forms of corruption, the Baath regime of Iraq maintained power. Through a system of multi-faceted corruption, Saddam was able to divert hundreds of millions from the UN administered Oil-for-Food program. However, corruption continued with the succeeding program of Development Fund for Iraq created after the American occupation. According to an American report in 2006, Iraq revealed 72 cases of corruption; many contractors were caught overcharging the occupation authorities, and \$8.8 billion were lost (Silvestre, 2009: 2). In 2005, a case of fraud in which \$1.3 billion procurement budget disappeared though

military contractors were paid fully in advance. The defense minister Shaalan escaped to London after an arrest warrant had been issued for him in such a big case of theft in Iraq (Hastings, 2009: 4). Further evidence of the combination of government-structural and self-enrichment corruption was found in the Health Ministry controlled by militia which made hindered serving the public (http://www.cnn.com/2007/world/meat/09/27/iraq.draft.report/index.html: 2).

Through the same forms of corruption, the Baath party maintained power in Syria. Like Iraq, the structure of government is the main source of both types of corruption in Syria. The Syrian ruler Hafiz al-Assad was running a political system of authoritarianism and anachronism. He derived support from the army and his al-Alawi family against the majority Sunnis who were largely excluded from decision-making and were subjected to the government watch. The legislative branch had no effect in political life while the executive controlled politics. The al-Assad's family members did not abide by the law. His brother Rifaat was well-known for corruption. The government intervention in the economy impeded growth and productivity, which resulted in a paralyzed private sector; therefore, those who supported the regime could use corruption to benefit (Deegan, 1993: 65-66). This opened the way for using connection (Wasta), bribes, favoritism, criminality, exemption from the law enforcement and arbitrariness. Self-enrichment, through these forms of corruption, became a fact of life under the corrupt political regime of al-Assad. Corruption has continued under the current president Bashar whose maternal cousin, Rami Makhluf, influenced Syrian officials for his self-enrichment. He obtained the permission from government officials to issue profitable commodity contracts in order to gain access to lucrative oil exploration and power plant projects which generated economic complaints from the business community (http://treas.gov/press/releases/hp34.htm, 2009: 2).

This practice of multiple-corruption is rampant in Lebanon where the government is made-up of sects and families. Certain influential families have controlled the government through a European-imposed political dispensation which is responsible for creating incoherent economic system based on infeasible and secret economics. Family-based political power enabled the corrupt to gain economic benefit and high social status (124-122 :1997، (ذيبيان)). Once in government, public officials abuse their position to enrich themselves from the public resources. Top Lebanese government officials like the prime-minister Hariri and other ministers were under the indictment of stealing \$600

million of municipal money. In addition to swindling pubic money, they struck illegal deals with the private Sokleen Company for Cleaning in Beirut (10 :1999: 10). Such government corruption was a ripe environment for self-enrichment through illegitimate means of taking bribes; for example, corrupt inspectors exempted dutiable goods passing through the Beirut Sea Port (TI Newsletter, September 1998: 6). Several facets of corruption have taken root as the political structure allowed that to happen in Lebanon. According to a Lebanese economist, bribery in the pubic sector, tax evasion and abuse of power widespread are in the country (http://www.monstersandcritics.com/news/middleeast/news/aticle 1433022.php :2). It can be seen in these practices that one type of corruption begets another in a family and sect-based political culture.

Family-based political culture encompasses other Arab countries like Jordan, which is also the scene an established government-structural and selfenrichment corruption in the public and private sectors. Government laws hinder work and investment which pushed capital and skills out of Jordan. Employment is obtained through connection (wasta) and not merit. The employed, regardless of their poor performance, continue working and prevent other job-seekers from working as those corrupt employees see themselves owners of the place which in fact belongs to the public. They derive influence from their tribal position in the government. They are also above reproach or evaluation since they are not accountable by an authority. The standard of good performance is silence. With the absence of transparency and accountability, there is no chance for administrative reform which resulted in waste and vacating work positions (67-66: 1999، صبرى). It was inevitable for this government maladministration to produce an increasing unemployment in Jordan. One of the major reasons to unemployment, according to Ahmed Atwan, is over-employment in the public sector and the failure of the public educational system to teach the needed skills. Unemployment reached 14.8% in 1987, 18.7% in 1993, and 14.4% in 1997. However, among people under 34 years old, unemployment reached 77% in 1997 (25-23 :1999). Definitely getting a job in the government through family and tribal influence is responsible for clogging government departments with unneeded and unqualified personnel. This squandered the public fund away from being invested in public education and harmed the general interests. With a government operating on familial and tribal influence, self-enrichment through

bribes, nepotism and favoritism in the public and private sectors became a fact of life in Jordan. According to the Arab Human Development Report (AHDR), government officials, including judges, politicians and businessmen, practice in great degrees favoritism and bribery (Joha, 2005: 2). Corrupt partnership between government employees in the ministry of trade and industry and businessmen reached the level of forging bank documents from a non-existing bank to give residency permits to Arab investors (http://ajloun.blogspot.com/2006/10/fighting-corruption.html: 1-2).

While it is a truism to associate corruption with autocratic Arab governments, it can also be detected in a democratically elected government of Palestine. The Executive Power constantly neglected the Legislative Council intent and advice to the degree of the council becoming an "obeying tool" as one of the representatives said (19-18 :1999). (حقوق الناس، آذار 1999: 00-18). Another representative asked in 1998 if the Legislative Council should accommodate corruption by re-appointing ministers previously accused of corruption. He added that re-appointing them was against transparency and accountability In 1997 the Legislative Council asked the President (الافرنجي ،أيلول 1998: 12-15) to dismiss corrupt ministers who exploited the laws, wasting and stealing money. In a public poll, 77% of people believed there was corruption in the government (7-5 :1998) (شاهين) Corruption of officials wasting public money was found in several forms, such as two government salaries, secret accounts, حقوق الناس،) overspending public money and refusing to pay back the loans (حقوق الناس 13-11: (تموز 1997: 13-11) Another form of corruption appeared in the high number of office managers in governmental departments, even higher than in United States, taking into account the difference in population size. This emerged because of random appointment through connection (wasta) for gaining political advantage, without office need. There were 1200 managers in 25 ministries which took most of the budget for salaries. It was found that four managers were supervising one employee in the same office, a manager receiving salary without going to office, and employees working somewhere else instead of doing their government jobs (19-17 :1997) المناس، تموز 1997: Other (حقوق الناس، تموز examples of corruption were found in repeatedly selling rotten food materials, such as the flour case in Nablus in 1997. 5,000 tons of Italian flour were stored in unsuitable stores and then sold cheap in the city itself and Israel without accountability of ministers involved in the affairs as the Legislative Council demanded (47-45: 1997 الناس، ايار Once again spoiled flour was

distributed in Nablus in 1998 with a complete denial by the Ministry of Social Affairs and the Ministry of Supplies (Abdallah, 1998: 4).

A fixed feature of corruption is the wide use of connection (wasta) for employment or personal gain. In most cases, connection is more important than qualification. A son of a deputy minister, for instance, was appointed as a حقوق الناس، تموز (1997:) manager although he did not have a high school degree 19) 83% of people believed that connection was the way for getting a job (حقوق 19:198 It seems that corruption forms of connection, nepotism. (الناس، أيلول 1998: 19 and bribery are dominant features of business life in Palestine as is the case in other Arab countries. In a study done by Samir Abuznaid on the West Bank managers, it was found that managers practiced connection (wasta) in the private sector as much as 93.5%, in the public sector 94.0%, while nepotism reached in the private sector 59.7 and in the public sector 58.0%. These methods are pursued in violation of the law as a result of the family influence (Abuznaid, 1991: 113-114)[•] Obviously, there was interrelationship between the government-structural and self-enrichment corruption in Palestine while democracy was taking root in the country. The lack of law enforcement opened the way for public officials and private citizens to take advantage of profiting at the expense of the public good. The Palestinian Attorney General revealed other cases of corruption in 2006. He found that public officials had stolen hundreds of millions of dollars and investigated 50 cases of selfish theft and embezzlement. The problem of corruption was emphasized by the World Bank officials who said that a lot of money was wasted by maladministration and incompetence

(http://www.arabnews.com/?page=7&ection=0&article=77375&=6&m=2&y=2 006:1). In 2005, Palestine was ranked in the Transparency International index of corruption number 107 out of 158 countries (http://www.multage.org/etemplate.php?id=1005. 2009 06:52:10 GMT:1).

North-African Arab Countries

Unbalanced private and public interests through corruption is endemic of the Egyptian government. The political system is a prey for selfish elites collecting wealth and maintaining influence by all corrupt means at the expense of the Egyptian people. This has been the path of the ruling national democratic party headed by Mubarak to control the political-economic power over the Egyptian majority. Instead of leaving office after many years of power, he still wins elections by more than 95% which allows him to extend his rule

indefinitely. In fact, Mubarak is the ultimate decision-maker regarding any thing in Egypt. He has rejected all political and constitutional reforms. Meanwhile, the economic conditions have gone down and peoples' rights have been persecuted. He is still beyond accountability as he is protected by his party which dominates the peoples' legislative council (1999، البلشي). In the name of democracy, Mubarak paralyzes the opposition and works for the interests of his party members through abusing the legislative power. Its interrogation function has been reduced to give the executive a free hand in the legislative process and a leeway for avoiding accountability of corruption. For instance, the People's Council could not question the minister of transportation for the negligence that led to a train accident in Kofr al-Dawar in which many were killed and injured (1999. حماد).

Political confusion and fragmentation allowed for misusing and wasting the public funds. In 1997 the government abused investing 900 million Egyptian sterling of the public insurance money in the financial market with little interest rate on the government. This public money was deducted from the salaries of public employees for their social security retirement. The government risked investing insurance money in the name of getting revenue not guaranteed by the ups and downs of the financial market. There was no watching authority on the government of Mubarak to defend against wasting money which was considered the security for many people in their old age (i = 1000, i = 1000). The loss of public money continued by another form of corruption as "Opportunists and cheaters" stole money and land from the housing organizations under their management (1999).

Not only public resources were wasted in the absence of democracy, but also people succumbed to government violence. Officials broke the law without the fear of being held accountable for their acts. Human rights were easily violated in the name of law and order. In August 1998, the Egyptian police attacked the village of Alkish in Suhaj district in the wake of a murder, which inflicted collective punishment on the village. Because the Egyptian Human Rights Organization protested against the police action, it was abused by the police under the accusation of working for a foreign power (عبد الرزاق ، 1999). Another example on the police abuse was the attack on the Egyptian Law Association in April 1999 in the name of maintaining order inside the Association which described the government action as illegal (القدس ، 13 القدس ، 12 :1999). In the light of police violations against citizen rights and Mubarak's

strangling policy of the legislative power of accountability, all sorts of corruption happened through the public and private sectors of Egypt. The situation is described in a report by the Egyptian coalition group Kifaya in July 2006, which says that corruption spread to all cultural, political, social and economic aspects of society, reaching the point of becoming a social law. Corruption appeared in the government privatization program, in the ministries of heath, agriculture, petroleum, finance and antiquities, and in the interference of security forces in public life. The report says further that corruption is exemplified by using political influence to gain government contracts and bribes to pay bureaucrats for services. This report corroborates what the Egyptian economist Ahmad al-Sayed al-Najjar said that a lot of public money, which could have been used for economic development, was stolen (http:////www.irinnews.org/report.asp?reportid=5439-Egypt: 1-2). In the word of Colonel Muhammed al-Ghannam who worked in the Ministry of Interior, corruption reached unprecedented level, at which the government sold public companies with much less than their value to businessmen working for Mubarak's sons and to companies paying commissions for Mubarak and his sons or officials. Mubarak maintained his position through bribing security officers stand against his political opponents to (http://english.pravda.ru/opinion/colunists/17-05-2004/5612-egypt-0: 1-2).

Caught in the amalgamation of corruption is also Libya. Like other Arab countries, it is ruled by a political dictatorship that does not practice the separation of powers. This situation is justified on the anachronistic notion of practicing direct popular democracy of the ancient Greek city-state in which there were no representatives of people, rather people were representatives of themselves. By contrast, Libya has one man only running its affairs without power-sharing by the people who are largely illiterate and misinformed. Their political participation has no effect on decision-making and they mostly do not care to participate since it is not likely that they would bring about any change. Al-Kaddafi, as supported by the military forces as well as the tribes makes decisions with regard to their political-economic life without accountability. For instance, he enacted a law to exempt foreign companies in Libya- with an underlying harm to Libyan development- from taxes, fees and allowed them to expatriate their profit and capital (1997 ، كوستا These advantages facilitated for such companies to maximize their benefits through corruption as did the Norwegian oil company StatoilHydo, the Spanish Repsol YPF and the French

2009

Total by bribing Libyan officials (http://www.globalwitne.org/media_library_detail.php/683/en/statoilhydros_lib yan_coruption_scandal_shows_need:1). Only few Libyans in connection with the regime could benefit in terms of jobs and interests. The oil industry is a fertile ground for many facets of corruption in which public officials, local and foreign and international businessmen were involved. Favoritism and nepotism are a way of life. These exist along other forms of corruption like incompetence, inefficiency, abuse of power, arbitrariness, embezzling, bogus service, breaking the law and expediency.

It can clearly be seen that government-structural and self-enrichment corruption is wide-spread from Kuwait to Libya in Arab countries. Their dictatorial political culture is a breeding ground for all sorts of corruption from the ruler's suffocation of the legislative power to police violation of the people's rights and bribes given for personal gain. The chain of corruption is never broken off as one form of corruption reinforces another back and forth in public and private sectors. However, certain internal and external methods and measures are to be taken in Arab countries to fight corruption, as figure 1, page 32 shows. This will thoroughly be discussed in the next part.




Figure (1): Corruption and the Fight Against It in Arab Countries

It shows that the Arab Political Culture is the Source of both governmental and selfenrichment corruption at the three levels of symptoms, types and practice. The figure identifies internal and external factors affecting certain Arab countries in fighting against corruption and its output.

Methods and Measures of Combating Political Corruption in Arab Countries

The acid test of a government's sincerity in wiping out bureaucratic corruption hinges not only on the formulation of anti-corruption measures. Rather its credibility lies in the actual implementation of such measures and their effects on the behavior of civil servants and the society at large.

Dr. Jon Quah, Bureaucratic corruption: A comparative Analysis of their Anti-Corruption strategies (Pope, 1996: 23).

Need for Elected Parliament, Civil Society Organizations, Public Service Ideology, Private Sector, free Media and Press, and International Activities

Combating the government-structural and self-enrichment corruption in Arab states requires an elected legislative power, aided by a free judiciary and well-developed civil society with its own organizations, as a partner to government in ensuring democracy. Pope saw the solution to corruption through building a democratic structure of government alongside civil society, separate but, in cooperation with the government and the private sector. He elaborated on these ideas by saying that elected parliaments are the embodiment of democracy as they allow public scrutiny and accountability. Civil society can keep a watchful eye on the government and the private sector, and their cooperation depends on the government as it lays down legal and regulatory basis for a civil society of multiple organizations to work effectively against corruption. Public servants, whether elected or appointed, must be held accountable to their deeds which require reforming the administrative laws of government. Decisions must be made in correspondence to law. This must be done within an independent judiciary between the government and people (Pope, 1996: 27, 35-37, 39, 49, 59). These democratic processes will inevitably result in developing public service ideology, which Caiden spoke of early in this work, as characteristic of democratic societies. However, its application would be useful for Arab countries to guard against corruption. But, these countries have political tribalism as the way of obtaining jobs, which sustains corruption to the point of becoming an obstacle to strategic planning, aiming to benefit all society. Only with harnessing the administrative reform can شهوان ،) corruption be defeated as destructive to government and society alike 1998).

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The fight against corruption took combined efforts encouraged by the Transparency International to bring Arab and American non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to hold a conference in which the United States and Arab governments held an economic forum in Detroit, 2003. This forum was attended by World oil companies and industry executives to bring attention to government-imposed constraints on Arab NGOs and the media which were involved in public life in Arab countries (Stassen, 2009: 1-2). Further collective efforts were made by 19 Arab countries through holding an anti-corruption conference in Jordan, 2008, with the aim of ending the waste of public wealth, help the progress and development of Arab societies as integral parts of a democratic government (Mustafa, 2008: 1-2). With some democratic winds blowing in Arab countries, this created a ground for civil society organizations (non-governmental organizations) to appear in different places and take part in the fight against corruption, by placing it on Arab and international agendas. There was, in spite of governmental attempts to control these organizations, some improvement in combating corruption in Arab Gulf countries, such as, UAE, Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait, besides Jordan, as the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) stated in its 2006 report (Arab Archive Institute, 2007: 2-3). The role of Arab NGOs, as described by Arab press, has been growing in pushing transparency mechanism, functioning democratic institutions, toward strengthening citizen-government relationship through participation in decisionmaking, building alliances between governments and parliaments on one hand and the private sector and civil society organizations on the other, strengthening public institutions and creating balanced economic plans (Khaleej Times, 2009: 1-2). But the efforts of NGOs had to be coupled with participation of the private sector to create the political will to successfully fight corruption in developing Arab countries by putting the right leader in place, building government and market institutions to work interchangeably for economic development and creating coalitions. Irene Hors clarified the private sector contribution against corruption in the following: raising awareness against corruption, setting standards, assisting with monitoring policy change efforts, advocating anti-corruption reform, adopting codes of ethics and transparent accounting standards, reforming business environments, acting as pressure groups for public reforms, performing watchdog activities to strengthen the rule of law, acting as transparent and a mediator favoring business competition (Hors, 2009: 1-8). The fight against corruption was joined by the UN which

brought 19 Arab countries together in a special conference in Amman in 2008 to reinforce transparency and accountability measures (Mareb Press-Saba, 2009: 1-2). The UN succeeded in strengthening anti-corruption efforts as is shown in the winning of prizes by Arab bureaucrats at the UN headquarters in New York in 2008, though the road was tough and long in fighting corruption (Reinl, 2009: 1-2). In addition to collective Arab and international anti-corruption efforts, there also were more individual and group efforts by Arab countries to fight corruption.

Fighting Corruption in Arab Gulf Countries

The administrative reform within a democratic Arab political culture requires neutralizing the state from dominating the society. Thobian demands that Arab governments must be seen working for everybody and not only for the ruling families, tribes, parties and selfish supporters. The government officials must serve the public regardless of their social background and political loyalties (116-113 :1997 : نبيان) This means that Arab governments must not dominate the political scene, but leave it as the domain of their civil societies. In the Gulf States under monarchical-dynastic regimes, as Kasem Criticized, there was a heavy involvement of government in the business life, which was preventing strategic planning. The Governments were interested in fat business contracts and subsidies at all cost. This encouraged a built-in inefficiency and centralized management. Thus managers became more dependent on the government than on their creativity leading to uncertainty. Besides, ethnic sensitivity plaguing the Gulf managers caused waste and prevented strategic planning (Kasem and Habib, 1989: 412-413). These political and business facets of corruption in the Gulf States must be faced with political openness to allow criticism, transparency, accountability and liability. This can be achieved by adopting the Transparency International recommendations: abolishing gifts; revealing and monitoring assets and sources of income; confiscating and freezing stolen public money; removing immunity of officials; allowing free press; promoting anti-corruption culture and public debate, and preventing the convicted from holding public offices (International Anti-Corruption Conference, 1997 : 3-5). The success of such measures depended on the cooperation of government, civil society, the private sector and international efforts.

To achieve success, Arab parliamentarians, among whom were Saudi, Kuwaiti, Palestinian and Lebanese officials, established a special organization

in 2008, to improve accountability, build civil society organizations, and the UN endeavor fight corruption support to (http://www.arpacnetwork.org/adefault.aspx?lang=e.: 1). Furthermore .the Saudi government, on the order of King Abdullah, planned in 2007 to investigate officials, and protect integrity to improve the image of the country, nationally, regionally and internationally, however, with out expecting much of success (http://www.gulftimes.com/site/topics/article.asp?cu no=2&item no=13402, 2009: 1). Making its own efforts, Kuwait started in the parliament a special anti-corruption unit which joined, as did Yemen and Palestine, the international parliamentarian organization for fighting corruption (http://arabicnews.com/ansub/daily/day/050418/2005041812). More anticorruption activities took place in Qatar where a special conference was held in 2008, attended by civil groups, international agencies, governmental and nongovernmental organizations and multi-national organizations. The Oatari representative spoke of the role of ethical education of the young in fighting corruption http://www.gulftimes.com/site/topics/article.asp?cu no=2&item no=223767&version=1&temp late id=36&parent id=16., 2009: 1). Earlier activities to fight corruption were initiated by Bahrain in 2002 to achieve administrative reform, raise productivity, create transparency and impartiality and protect public money (http://www.arabicnews.com/ansub/daily/day/020321/2002032127.html., 2009:1). Bahrain could like, Oman and Qatar improve their corruption efforts as mentioned by the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI). According to Transparency International in 2008, Bahrain ranked 43, Oman 41, Oatar 28, Kuwait 65, UAE 35 and Saudi Arabia 80. These numbers explain the need for the Arab Gulf countries to fight corruption more aggressively (Ali, 2009: 1-2). The UAE hastened to announce in 2000 tough legal and legislative measures corruption public against in the and private sectors (http://www.uaeinteract.com/docs/fighting corruption is too for dubai gover nment/3158.htm., 2009: 1). The Arab Gulf countries benefited from a program of training civil society activists to fight corruption launched by the Human Rights Information & Training Center (HRITC) in 2007. The program provided UN anti-corruption activities with other methods of combating corruption. It emphasized the principles of good governance, ethics of civil society activists, national anti-corruption strategy, cooperation between local

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and international non-government organizations, and how to employ the methods of TI in fighting corruption (<u>http://www.yobserver.com/local-news/10015558.html</u>, 2009: 1).

Fighting Corruption in Fertile Crescent Arab Countries

The same anti-corruption mechanisms must be applied in other Arab countries; among them are the Fertile Crescent countries of Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and Palestine, for they are victims of similar political corruption, as being part of the same despotic political culture. Aside from the elected government of Palestine, Iraq was dominated for decades by the Baath party, then succumbed to imposed American-sponsored governments, Syria has a Baath-dominated state; while Lebanon has a confessional-anarchic system and there is a monarchical-dynastic state in Jordan. Unless these countries democratize by having a strong legislative power and an independent judiciary in a civil society of a free private sector, there would be no chance for removing inefficiency, waste, fraud, misuse of position and other forms of corruption. As for Iraq under Saddam Hussein, it was not possible to institute anti-corruption measures as it would weaken his grip on power. Any political and administrative reform would allow the opposition to rise, free press and media to criticize, civil society and international activists to expose wrong doings, which in total would have brought his regime to an end. For the post-Saddam governments, the TI recommended in 2005 that anti-corruption method be applied to foreign contractors, independent auditing of government and penalty for corruption (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/4353491.stm, 2009: 1-2). Efforts to fight corruption started in earnest by the Iraqi Civil Society and Independent Media Program (ICSP) and the Civil Society Organization (CSOs) which ran programs to train Iraqi officials and to educate the public on fighting The Iraqi constitution of 2005 contained items of instituting corruption. accountability and transparency mechanisms (http://www.usaid.gov/iraq/updates/aprob/iraq_fs24_042106.pdf, 2009: 1-3).

While the end of Baath in Iraq created the chance for fighting corruption, attempts of cleaning up the mess in Syria had been half-hearted, because the Baath party was only interested in maintaining power by all means. Assad, senior and junior, through the al-Alawi family and the military support sustained a one-man regime without having the real separation of powers, hence opening the way for capable private sector and active civil society. This is why inefficiency, waste, fraud and disrespect of human rights remained under

their rule as rampant as ever (Deegan, 1993: 65-66, 78-81). Corruption in Syria must be confronted on the basis of Pope's solution of applying transparency and accountability measures, as part of a public integrity system. It includes parliamentary anti-corruption mechanisms; building workable partnership between government and civil society, making administrative reforms and laws, setting up channels for public officials to report corruption, having independent judiciary as deterrent to corruption, having transparent public procurement system, putting the private sector self-regulation with legal deterrence to corruption and allowing press freedom (Pope, 1996: 23, 5). More efforts of combating corruption were taken by Bashar since 2000 as a modernist who wanted a clean government. He dismissed a former Prime Minister Mahmoud al-Zoubi from the Baath party leadership accusing him with grafts and other officials also were removed from office for abusing their positions (http://www.arabicnews.com/ansub/daily/day/000512/2000051209.html, 2009: 1-2). He asked the party in 2005 to reform according to internal needs and considered corruption a moral, economic and social problem which was to be fought (http://www.arabicnews.com/ansub/daily/day/050606/2005060621.html, 2009: 1-2).

The measures of combating corruption must equally be applied in Lebanon. Small steps were taken by Lebanon, like setting up the "Najm" anticorruption project in Beirut, and hesitantly accusing the former prime-minister Hariri and some officials of corruption. Such steps were not enough and the root cause of corruption, i.e., the constitution was not tackled. The colonial French-designed political system of a family-sect basis had to be replaced by a democratic one for all the Lebanese as equal citizens. Despite the cosmetic political changes brought by internal fighting, Lebanon was still living under a system of contradictory interests revolving around the traditional-political figure "Za'im." This phenomenon symbolized the political fragmentation of Lebanon by conflicting patronage, group affinities, business sympathies and ethnic divisions. Superficial constitutional reforms starting with September 1990, through May 1991, did not incur democratic separation of power and a non-ethnic secular system with free ways of governance (Deegan, 1993: 104, 107-108, 111, 113, 115-116). The majority of citizens would demand reforming the election law based on feudal and confessional considerations to serve national interests and prevent foreign intervention in Lebanese affairs. There were some anti-corruption steps taken against politicians and civil servants,

with some government-sponsored workshops since 1996 to widen public awareness of fighting corruption. Yet the media and the NGOs were not effective in informing the public and exposing corruption scandals (http://www.mafhoum.com/press/corruption/summary.html, 2009: 2-3). More actions were taken by the government in 2007 to join the Lebanese Society for the Promotion of Transparency in order to combat graft. This agreement would allow the government to prosecute individuals engaged in embezzlement and Public demand to fight corruption was raised by misuse of public funds. Hizbbollah who asked the government to examine accounts and spending bills corruption to expose (http//:www.monsterandcritics.com/news/middleeast/nerws/article 1433022.ph With a political system manipulated by corruption, Lebanon p, 2009: 1-2). needed to apply the above-recommended anti-corruption measures and methods of combining democratic government, free private sector, public service

ideology, international activities and civil society organizations. These multiple anti-corruption mechanisms must also be applied to Jordan under the dominant Hashemite dynasty. The colonial British-designed constitution of 1928 and 1946, modified in 1951-52, left the king in control as he could appoint the upper house of notables, and the cabinet which had legislative power as well. In spite of Palestinians being the majority, they enjoyed lesser political rights than the deemed original Jordanians. Lifting the ban on the parties in June 1991 did not democratize the system, since it was conditioned on their loyalty to the Hashemite ruling family (Deegan, 1993: 20-22, 29, 33). The lower house remained incapable of curbing the dominating executive branch. Elections continued to be marred by government intervention to prejudice their results like what had happened in 1997. Since loyalty was the key to influencing the government, no wonder much waste, inefficiency, mismanagement and selfishness dominated the public and private sectors. Applying transparency and accountability methods in these sectors, with free press informing the public would be effective weapons against public and private corruption. It was equally significant to have an independent judiciary which Pope called the public watch-dog over the branches of government. It could deter politicians and civil servants from abusing their positions for fear of being publicly exposed and humiliated (Pope, 1996: 95). Such goals were hoped to be achieved when Jordan established a special unit with legislations to fight corruption in 2000 to enhance good governance in the

public sector and fight the misuse of power and public fund. Further steps were announced by King Abdallah in 2004 by speaking of the need for good governance and transparency in political, economic and social reform. However, the press and NGOs were not free to fight corruption but hindered by government decision makers (<u>http://www.1stjordan.net/actuuk/archivesuk/resultat.php?id=69&debut=0</u>, 2006: 1-2).

The combat against corruption was pursued in Palestine where political and economic reform was most needed under strangling Israeli occupation. Among the Palestinians existed the feeling of dissatisfaction with their government performance and corrupt officials. The degree of power separation was decreasing as the executive branch step-sided the advice of legislators who found ministers failing in their duty. The government corruption was spilling over into the business sector, as deals were struck secretly with profit-seekers. Connection (wasta) and bribe (bakhshish), instead of qualifications and eligibility, were widely used to obtain a job or business transactions from the government. The Palestinian government must put its house in order by respecting the legislative council which must have full power in watching over the executive branch, as a constitutional duty. This would enhance accountability and law enforcement in the political system. Thus, the public trust in government will be increased when the people see corrupt officials were relieved of their duty. Also, the laws of government must be united throughout the land as they were different in Gaza and the West Bank. In the business sector, the government must stop intervening to bias the market by allowing ministries to import goods which would allow them to steal and swindle money. Also, punishing officials could deter others from committing corruption. To make the fight against corruption instrumental, the government would support independent anti-corruption agencies and commissions. Pope recommended that such agencies must be kept small, lest they become amenable to corruption. It should have the power to employ the law enforcement and closely work with the public in making policy. So that the government and the private sector operatives could be involved to prevent corruption (Pope, 1996 :103, 105, 107). Curbing corruption was the goal of a meeting held by the Palestinian Coalition for Integrity and Accountability in Ramellah and Gaza on the occasion of the International Anti Corruption Day in 2008. It aimed at strengthening transparency and accountability methods, the role of independent judiciary and

free press was stressed in fighting corruption. The Palestinian civil society will coordinate with the judiciary in exposing corruption cases and will cooperate with international NGOs on fighting corruption (http://www.tranparency.org/news_room/latest_news/press_releases_nc/2008/2 008_12_16_palestine_acday, 2009: 1-2). But the lack of free Palestinian control and movement in the West Bank and Gaza due to the Israeli occupation would limit the effectiveness of anti-corruption methods.

Fighting Corruption in North-African Arab Countries

Anti-corruption measures and methods were tried, with varying degrees in Egypt and Libya, where the separation of power is weak in Egypt and superficial in Libya, which created a dictatorial environment fraught with corruption. In Egypt, the legislative council was dominated by the executive branch which decided on all issues. This freed Mubarak from being held accountable to the parliament which was supposed to be the ultimate public authority. This gave protection for his supporters to seek self-enrichment by all means possible. This is why the law was repeatedly violated without punishment, and no wonder why corrupt public officials were able to expand corruption to the private sector with bribery, theft, fraud, racketeering and abuse of the human rights. Corruption could only be eradicated in a political democracy. Hence, a strong legislative power was the iron-clad guarantee against corrupt executive and public officials as held accountable to their deeds, and a civil society with independent institutions to detect and expose corruption were indispensable. Among them would be the ombudsman who could investigate the maladministration, bribery, favoritism, nepotism, neglect, incompetence and inefficacy. He could also suggest solutions to corruption since he was trusted by the government and citizens alike. In addition, the auditor-general as the party responsible to the Parliament must work on behalf of citizens in terms of watching over the government income and expenditure. He would ensure that the executive comply with the parliamentary appropriations, promote efficiency and prevent corruption (Pope, 1996: 55, 69). The existence of such public office, alongside other anti-corruption institutions, as part of a democracy would overcome corruption. Ahmed el-Naijar maintained that the basic condition of fighting corruption was the existence of a democratic political system in which there was independent judiciary, separation of powers and a time limit for public employees in administrative posts (Mazen, 2009:2) To stem corruption, the government set up the

Transparency and Integrity Committee in 2007 to enhance the ministry of State for Administrative Development efforts to enforce anti-corruption rules. The committee will cooperate with international organizations and the UN toward The government will establish a hotline for public fighting corruption. complaints and help formulate institutional and legislative framework of monitoring and fighting corruption. Furthermore, the government will inform regarding about duties the public their rights and corruption 406.htm., 2009: 1)

The democratic anti-corruption methods were needed in Libya which has been under one-man rule since 1969. Al-Kaddafi combined the three powers without being accountable to a public authority. It was popularized in Libya that democracy brings corruption, while in fact the lack of it forced people to seek corrupt means of getting their business done. Bribes, nepotism, favoritism and connection were widely used to obtain jobs or business deals. These corrupt methods brought many incompetents to high positions which caused inefficiency, waste, abuse of authority and embezzlement without existing measures of transparency and accountability. This gave way for selfishness to become the overriding mode of living in a very harsh political environment in which the private sector was stifled. The public sector controlled the economic life in the name of national interests. Thus, corruption came natural of these political-economic circumstances. The only way out for Libya, as it was for other Arab states, was to live by democracy. In summary, the recommended measures were: separation of powers; commitment of leaders to combat corruption, emphasizing prevention of corruption; comprehensive anti-corruption legislation implemented by agencies of integrity; effective legal and administrative laws; cooperation of government and civil society and making corruption a high risk enterprise (Pope, 1996, Executive Summary). The Libyan opposition groups considered al-Kaddafi responsible for corruption and was no hope for recovery except for establishing a constitutional and democratic system (http://www.middle-estinf.org/league/libya/libya.htm. 2009: 2). To improve its image, Libya exchanged visits with UN officials like Antonio Maria Costa who visited Libya to fight corruption activities by training law enforcement officers, running seminars and workshops intended to fight corruption (http://www.afrol.com/articles/103. 2009: 1-2). Libya brought up the issue of corruption through its UN-representative who said that corruption of

crimes, bribery and secret bank accounts to launder money were hindering development and should have been fought (<u>http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?newsid=2350&cr=general+asembly&c r1=debate</u>.2009: 1).

In addition to fighting corruption inside Arab countries, it must be combated by regional and international cooperation. The Arab countries must have common mechanisms of treaties and agencies, dealing with corruption in public and other social institutions. Laundering money to Arab banks must be returned and the criminals of corruption must be caught and extradited. Centers of human rights watch must be established in the Arab World to defend against the persecution of people. And of course, organizations to educate people on democratic values, to build democratic parties, democratic institutions and democratic governments, must be the vanguard of the anti-corruption campaign.

On the international level, Arab countries must work with international agencies to reveal the corrupt deals between Arab nationals, companies and governments on the one hand, and their foreign peers on the other hand. For instance, European banks drew a lot of laundered money from Arab countries protected by secret laws. It was a sign of hope that the Swiss government decided to help investigate money, proven by court it was stolen. Also, the international police organizations (INTERPOL) based in France with centers around the World would be of a great help in fighting corruption by supplying data on thieves and criminals. Here, reaching extradition agreements among countries would be instrumental. The international cooperation against corruption reached the point of striking a European multilateral agreement in 1986 which is to be adopted World wide. Other international activities against corruption included the UN Convention against Illicit Trafficking in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances in 1980, and the Summit of the Americas of 1994 in Miami, to enhance the human rights (Pope, 1996: 110-113). Also, other international anti-corruption methods include complying with the UN Declaration Against Corruption and Bribery and the International Code of Conduct for public officials; suspension of corrupt governments by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund ; conditioning international finance on adopting transparency and accountability measures; joining international banks to detect laundered money; modernizing customs systems by emphasizing transparency. International donors must work directly with civil

society organizations and the international organizations must support the human rights in Arab countries (International Anti-Corruption Conference 1997:1-3). Pauline H. Barker, president of the Fund for peace organization which issues the Failed State Index (FSI) said that Arab countries have big capacity to improve their performance and avoid becoming failed states. Otherwise they will fall in political, economic and social anarchy. Countries like Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Oman, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Egypt and Libya fall below 5 out of 10 under Corruption Perception Index (CPI), Qatar scored 5.9, Bahrain 5 and UAE 5.7. All this means that Arab countries must combat corruption very seriously. It is, however, the responsibility of industrialized countries to cooperate with developing countries in the fight against corruption (Al Baik, 2009:2-4).

The strategy of fighting corruption in Arab countries included internal and external factors related to having democratic governments, civil society, free enterprise sector in addition to participating in international anticorruption activities as previously investigated and illustrated in figure 1, page 32.

Results :

This research has investigated the relationship between the political culture and corruption of government as well as other social institutions in Arab countries. It has been found that a political dictatorship is a symptom and a result of such culture and inevitably causes public and private corruption of all forms. Corruption could only be overcome through democratic political structures at the level of the government and society with an international cooperation. The theoretical framework and analysis of this work could be applied to other countries of similar political-social structures amenable to corruption.

The source of corruption in Arab countries lies in their adherence to oldfashioned political-social values which produce corrupt governments. Their main function is to enable ruling families, tribes, sects, parties and dictators to control people and wealth. Selfishness becomes the overriding power to shape one's views and actions toward others. Hence, a culture of "only individual gain matters at the expense of others" has developed in society. Morality and ethics become irrelevant and could be violated at one's choice. As a result, the concept of public interest is lost in the welter of political corruption, prevailing in the

absence of democratic institutions. Instead, there is a vicious circle of corruption engulfing the government and society in a perpetual process.

Two types of corruption have been identified: the government-structural and self-enrichment. These types were found to be the established channels of doing business in Oman, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Iraq under Saddam and the American occupation, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Palestine, Egypt and Libya. From these countries, the results could be generalized to other Arab countries not included in this study, since they all share the same dictatorial political culture. They are ruled by various brands of dictators as kings, presidents, Emirs and Sultans who are sustained in power by families, tribes, sects, parties and supporters in the military and society through networks of corruption. Although rulers are a minority in society but they control public wealth and political power. They are not accountable by public power since they consider themselves above the law. There is no effective transparency and accountability system in the Arab governments, nor are there free civil institutions to confront corrupt public servants and business operatives. The lack of anti-corruption measures allows Arab leaders to easily overcome the public opposition and strengthen their hold on public and private institutions. Under Arab political dictatorship, a despotic and rigid style of management called "bedoaucracy" has been developed. This concept means a of centralized authority. overstaffing. combination personalization. formalization, nepotism, cronyism and other forms of corruption.

Because they lack democracy, Arab states do not have a public service ideology to fight corruption. Their leaders are bred on corrupt values, like selfishness, tribalism, totalitarianism, favoritism, dishonesty, robbery, inefficiency, irresponsibility, randomness, discrimination, embezzlement, black-marketing, illegal investment, exemption from law enforcement and prevention of corruption investigation. These forms of corruption thrive in the absence of a respected legislative power, holding the executive accountable to its actions. This is a fertile ground for developing self-enrichment corruption in the forms of self-preservation, dishonesty, law circumvention, knit-circles of friends or tribesmen or villagers, kickbacks, favoritism, venality, incompetence and robbery.

Neither the government officials, nor their private business collaborators fear being caught and punished, but protected. The two types of corruption

create one corrupt environment, expanding with time, to include all society in one culture of multiple-corruption.

The strategy of fighting corruption in Arab countries is of two-folds, internal and external. The first fold is in having democracy for electing governments with transparency and accountability safeguards, building civil society of independent institutions and nourishing a free private sector. The second fold is in participating with international organizations and foreign countries to fight corruption.

Conclusion:

- 1. Corruption exists in each political culture, and therefore, it is present in each despotic or democratic government.
- 2. Whereas democratic governments are based on the separation of powers in which the legislative controls the executive, they are able to combat corruption, but when despotic governments combine the three powers, this is the corruption itself.
- 3. Arab governments are founded on family and tribal lines, not on a political ideology including all people. This is a fertile ground for a despotic political culture that promotes corruption.
- 4. Coming from a despotic political culture, Arab rulers use military power in order to keep the government as their property. Only those who support them could benefit and the rest are excluded.
- 5. Corrupt Arab rulers are immune to accountability and so are their cronies as they control the state.
- 6. No anti-corruption methods are instituted to fight corrupt officials because this will remove them from power; however, at times some methods are used in appearance, but they are exploited to fight their opponents.
- 7. Corruption in Arab countries is rampant in a self-perpetuated process in public and other social sectors.
- 8. There is no serious opposition from Arab masses against their corrupt rulers for fear of being of losing a job or being imprisoned.
- 9. Corruption has become a culture since moral and ethical standards are broken by corrupt leaders.
- 10. Since there are no internal mechanisms to control corrupt Arab leaders, the external pressure has not been effective in changing their unethical behavior.

11. Fighting corruption requires national, regional and international cooperation in which NGOs, UN, media and press, and industrialized countries join together.

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